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Abstract 
 
As a combination of online and offline channel 
services, multichannel healthcare services currently 
play important roles in helping consumers solve their 
health problems.  In this study, we establish a stylized 
model to investigate how healthcare service providers 
should price in multi-channels and when consumers 
should choose online service, taking misdiagnosis rate 
and the severity of disease problems into account. Our 
results show that the prices of the online channel and 
offline channel can increase when the misdiagnosis rate 
is low and minor problem inspection rate online is high. 
Moreover, when the diagnosis rate is high, the profit of 
online channel would increase, and then improve the 
profit of multichannel service. These findings provide 
insights for the theoretical research of online healthcare 
service and practice management on pricing strategies 
in multichannel healthcare services. 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Statistics showed that the number of medical 
practitioners in China has steadily increased from 2.08 
million in 2008 to 3.39 million in 2017 [17, 26]. In 
addition, the number of total treatments has raised from 
4.9 billion in 2008 to 8.1 billion in 2017 [9]. These data 
imply that the traditional offline healthcare system is 
over demand and under tremendous pressure. Therefore, 
an imbalance between the large amounts of consumers 
and the insufficient amounts of physicians exists. With 
the development of information technology, online 
healthcare service occurs [27]. As a supplement to 
traditional offline hospitals, online healthcare channel is 
gradually adopted by consumers [37]. 
Multichannel healthcare services involve both 
online and offline healthcare service to provide an 
additional amount of services than the traditional offline 
one [24]. In the traditional offline healthcare service, 
consumers first need to queue up for an appointment at 
the hospital. Then, physicians have a detailed and 
comprehensive knowledge of the consumers’ physical 
condition after the face-to-face inquiring and required 
physical testing. Finally, physicians provide consumers 
further diagnostic solutions or other suggestions. 
Therefore, consumers need to spend a substantial 
amount of time and energy to receive the offline channel 
healthcare service. In addition, the supply quantity of 
traditional offline healthcare service is limited by the 
number of physicians, because the limited provision of 
physicians can only serve a limited number of 
consumers in one day. 
In the online healthcare service, consumers need not 
have to wait in line as generally practiced in offline 
hospital. However, owing to the privacy concern of 
sharing health information online, consumers may be 
reluctant to tell their actual physical state to protect their 
privacy [19]. Under this information asymmetry 
circumstance, physicians may not know exactly about 
the consumer’s actual physical condition, which will 
lead to misdiagnosis and ineffective problem solving 
[22, 25]. Moreover, in some cases of healthcare 
problems, because of unavailable inspection equipment 
or technical limitations in the online channel, physicians 
cannot provide accurate solutions to consumers’ health 
problems online. In these cases, the physicians will 
advise consumers that additional offline service can 
offer a further accurate diagnosis. 
Some of the healthcare service providers still focus 
on offering service in traditional offline hospitals, 
whereas others may expand service to online channels, 
such as online healthcare communities [14]. 
Considering the differences between the online and 
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offline channels in the healthcare service market, we 
propose the following research questions: 
1. How do service providers set the price of online 
and offline channel respectively to maximize the profits 
of the multichannel healthcare service market? 
2. When do consumers prefer to choose online 
channel to seek a healthcare service? 
3. How will the profit of online channel affect the 
profits of offline channel and multichannel? 
From game theory [15, 16, 33] and utility 
maximization method [20], we establish a stylized 
model to address the issues of resource allocation and 
pricing strategies in online and offline channels. In our 
model, we not only investigate the multichannel 
services in the healthcare industry, but also take the 
misdiagnosis rate and the severity of disease problems 
into consideration. It also provides management advice 
for the healthcare service market. 
 
2. Literature review 
 
2.1. Multichannel healthcare services 
 
The recent growth of multichannel service is 
correlated to the booming development of information 
technology and e-services [4, 35, 27]. Offline channel 
and online channel are the two main ways of 
multichannel services. Previous studies have given 
different definitions of multichannel. Melis et al. [13] 
regarded multichannel as a combination of online stores 
and offline shops, which become an overall retailing 
mode. Berman and Thelen [2] stated that the integration 
between online and offline channels is the multichannel 
services, which is used in retail industry. However, 
healthcare service is different from retailing production 
[20]. According to Melis et al. [13], we define 
multichannel as a combination of online and offline 
channels, which can coexist in the healthcare service 
market. 
To manage multichannel retail market, prior studies 
have elucidated that a proper multichannel strategy can 
increase consumer loyalty [3] and improve profit [29]. 
In addition, Zhang et al. [11] listed some various key 
factors of multichannel retail service strategy, such as 
organizational structure, data integration, consumer 
analysis, and evaluation to show that how multichannel 
retailing evolve over time. Concerning consumers’ 
behavior in multichannel market, Gao and Su [5] 
investigated consumers’ purchasing behavior in both 
online and offline channels.  
Regarding the healthcare industry, many researchers 
focused on the either offline healthcare service [23] or 
online healthcare service [14]. For offline healthcare 
channel, researchers found that there is a significant 
spillover effect between regional offline hospitals [6]. 
Some studies pointed out that the use of information 
technology will influence the quality of healthcare 
service [1, 34]. For online healthcare channel, 
researchers figured out some driving factors in online 
healthcare consultation [18, 28], such as the use of social 
media and doctor-patient relationship.  Guo et al. [28] 
also found that the quantity of online consultation is 
related to the comment and degree of expertise as well 
as online price. Gradually, researchers began to 
investigate the multichannel healthcare service, which 
include both online channel and offline channel. Wu and 
Lu [7] stated that physicians with high reputation can 
strength the relationship between offline hospitals 
communication and online channel interaction. Akçura 
et al. [21] developed a mathematical model to explore 
the impact of online channel on service market, 
revealing that high-quality providers cannot offer a 
sufficiently high-quality online service. Also, Akçura 
and Ozdemir indicated that management strategy of 
online and offline service market should be different in 
multichannel healthcare service [20]. Previous studies 
mainly consider pricing from the perspective of service 
providers. Our study explores the impact of consumers' 
channel choice on online and offline channel’s pricing 
strategies from the perspective of consumers. 
 
2.2 Misdiagnosis 
 
Generally, consumers are concerned about the 
quality of healthcare service to solve health problems 
effectively. Physicians in traditional offline healthcare 
service can know comprehensively about consumers’ 
physical condition through face-to-face inquiry and 
physical examination. While in online healthcare 
channel, consumers can share limited information to 
physicians via online interaction, such as the discomfort 
of body. Therefore, there exist information incomplete 
and information asymmetry in the online healthcare 
service. And incomplete information or information 
asymmetry can lead to physicians' misdiagnosis [8]. 
Misdiagnosis is the mistakes or inaccuracies of the 
physician's diagnosis. Misdiagnosis has an adverse 
effect on the quality of healthcare service and makes 
consumers’ problems unsolved. Hyndman and Ozerturk 
[12] explored the relationship between consumers’ 
professional knowledge and the probability of being 
misdiagnosed in the process of healthcare service. They 
found that if physicians cheat the knowledgeable 
customers, market efficiency would reduce [12]. Also, 
some studies have suggested that searching for a second 
opinion, which means having a re-examination, can 
significantly reduce misdiagnosis [32]. 
In online healthcare service, existed studies mainly 
investigated the quality of online healthcare service, 
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such as consumers’ loyalty [30] and consumers’ 
satisfaction [36]. Regarding misdiagnosis in online 
healthcare service, researchers figured out that 
perceived usefulness of using smart healthcare service 
may decrease online misdiagnosis [10]. Researchers 
found that using artificial intelligence-based medical 
diagnosis support system in complex situations online 
would improve the accuracy and effectiveness of 
physicians’ diagnosis [31]. However, there is few 
research on studying the impact of online misdiagnosis 
in multichannel healthcare services. Our study takes the 
physician’s online misdiagnosis into account to develop 
the following model.  
 
3. Model 
 
Healthcare service market consists of consumers, 
who face problems, and physicians, who provide 
solutions or suggestions to consumers’ problems. The 
current study assumes that all consumers know they 
have some health problems but are unaware of the exact 
nature of their problems. Thus, consumers should 
attempt to seek solutions and solve their problems from 
either offline or online channels. 
The offline channel. Consumers who seek for 
offline channel service must visit hospitals. The distance 
cost of receiving offline services is 𝜀. When ε is large, 
the consumers will perceive the distance cost as 
excessively high to go offline. Then physicians 
communicate with consumers through face-to-face 
inquiry and examine the consumers’ physical condition 
so that they can offer solutions to consumers’ health 
problems. The marginal cost of serving a consumer in 
the offline hospital is c. In light of Akçura and Ozdemir 
[20], we assume that ε  and c are both distributed 
uniformly across [0, 1]. 
If the price of offline is 𝑝𝑓 , then, the utility of 
consumer who seeks and purchases service from the 
offline physician is given by: 
𝑈𝑓 = 𝑉 − 𝑝𝑓 − 𝜀,                        (3.1) 
where V is the base valuation. We assume that V is 
sufficiently high to allow at least some consumers to 
look for service in equilibrium. 
The online channel. Face-to-face interactions (i.e., 
offline channel) in a private physician’s office require 
consumers to disclose all relevant information and 
undergo physical examination for a thorough 
knowledge of their health problems. However, in online 
channel, physicians will receive less information with 
no inspection. In addition, Akçura and Srinivasan [19] 
have shown that consumers with privacy concern can 
only share limited information with others online. Such 
condition may decrease the accuracy of physicians’ 
diagnosis in the online channel. Thus, we conjecture that 
misdiagnosis will result in problems being unsolved in 
online channel than in offline healthcare service. 
When the physician misdiagnoses, the consumer 
will receive an ineffective solution. We assume that 
consumers will receive an effective diagnosis, so ℎ 
denotes the effective diagnosis rate in the online channel, 
where 0 < ℎ < 1 . Accordingly, consumers would 
receive a probability 1 − ℎ  of misdiagnosis. We 
conjecture that the misdiagnosis will result in problems 
unsolved. After being misdiagnosed in online channel, 
consumers would not believe online channel at all and 
consider if they should seek subsequent offline service 
or leave the market and relinquish any treatment. 
Because of the misdiagnosis, the consumers’ utility of 
the online channel will be reduced. Therefore, 𝐾 
denotes the utility loss after misdiagnosis. 
If the physician diagnoses effectively in the online 
channel, the physician will inform the consumer the 
nature of the problem and offer the consumer some 
suggestions. The diagnosis result will help consumers 
estimate the severity degree, whether major or minor. 
Major problems refer to more complex and severe 
diseases requiring further examination to identify their 
exact nature, such as chronic disease, cancer, 
cardiovascular disease, and cerebrovascular diseases. 
Minor problems are classified as sicknesses that are 
obvious and easy to judge and solve, such as influenza, 
cough, and diarrhea. Physicians can give further 
reasonable treatments to minor problems. However, to 
successfully solve consumers’ major problems, 
physicians need consumers’ medical history, inspection 
results, and several other related information, which 
only the offline environment can provide. To 
incorporate the severity degree of health problem in the 
online channel, we assume that a consumer has a minor 
problem online with a probability 𝛼, where 0 < 𝛼 < 1. 
When consumers first select the online channel for 
healthcare service and obtain the diagnosis result of a 
minor problem, the physician will solve the consumer’s 
problem. When consumers select the online channel for 
healthcare service first and obtain the diagnosis result of 
a major problem, they will consider the following 
behavioral decision (i.e., visit the offline hospital to test 
and solve problems or abandon any offline treatment). 
Regardless of the type of healthcare problems is major 
or minor, whether major or minor, we regard these 
problems would be solved via an offline channel. 
If the physician charges the price of the online 
channel 𝑝𝑜, then, the utility of consumer who purchases 
the service from the online physician is given by: 
𝑈𝑜 = (1 − ℎ)(V − 𝑝𝑜 − K − 𝑝𝑓 − 𝜀) + ℎα(V − 𝑝𝑜) 
+ℎ(1 − α)(V − 𝑝𝑜 − 𝑝𝑓 − 𝜀),                       (3.2) 
where the first, second, and third terms are for the utility 
of receiving misdiagnosis service, the utility of 
obtaining the effective service and the diagnosis of a 
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problem as a minor problem, and the utility of obtaining 
the effective service and the diagnosis of a problem as a 
major problem, respectively. 
Simplifying the formula above, we will obtain: 
𝑈𝑜 = (1 − ℎ𝛼)(𝑉 − 𝑝𝑜 − 𝑝𝑓 − 𝜀) + ℎ𝛼𝑉  
−𝑝𝑜 − (1 − ℎ)𝐾.                                 (3.3) 
Table 1 details the notation used in this study. 
Table 1. Notations and definitions 
 
Consumers in the healthcare service market have the 
following four options: (1) directly seeking offline 
service and solving the problem; (2) choosing online 
service first; obtaining offline face-to-face service or 
leaving the market once misdiagnosed; (3) if diagnosed 
with minor problems, it would be solved via an online 
channel; or (4) if diagnosed with major problems, it 
would be solved in an offline channel or leave the 
market. Figure 1 shows the process and decisions for the 
entire service in the market. 
4. Analysis 
 
First, the consumer considers whether the initial visit 
is offline or online. The consumer who is indifferent 
between offline and online channels is located at 𝜀0 . 
Solving Equations (3.1) and (3.3) for 𝜀0, we have: 
𝜀0 =
𝑝𝑜+(1−ℎ)𝐾 
ℎ𝛼
− 𝑝𝑓.                        (3.4) 
Second, if the consumer lives far away from the 
offline hospital, he would prefer online service because 
of the high transportation cost. However, when facing 
an ineffective service or a major problem, the consumer 
must consider the utility of the offline channel. The 
consumer, who lives farther away: 
                         𝜀1 = 𝑉 − 𝑝𝑓,                              (3.5)        
will find it too costly to seek an offline service, so he 
will leave the market without any solutions. The 
consumer who lives closer than 𝜀1 will prefer offline 
service to solve their problems. 
Thus, the profit function for the service provider is: 
Π = 𝜀0(𝑝𝑓 − 𝑐) + (1 − 𝜀0)𝑝0  
+(1 − ℎα)(𝜀1 − 𝜀0)(𝑝𝑓 − 𝑐),                      (3.6) 
where the first, second, and third terms are for the profits 
from offline (i.e., first) service, online service, and 
offline (i.e., second) service, respectively.  
Further simplifying the above equations, we thus 
have: 
Π = 𝜀0(𝑝𝑓 − 𝑐) + (1 − 𝜀0)𝑝0  
+(1 − ℎα)(𝜀1 − 𝜀0)(𝑝𝑓 − 𝑐).                   (3.7) 
Derivatives of 𝑝𝑜  and 𝑝𝑓  are obtained respectively 
from Formula (3.7). We can obtain the following 
optimal equilibrium prices of the online channel and 
offline channel: 
 
Figure 1. The process and decisions for the entire service in the market 
①
②
③
④
Second optionsSolutions
Problem 
classification
Consumers Physicians Physicians Consumers
First Offline
Channel
Online
Channel
Misdiagnosed
(ineffective)
Diagnosed
(effective)
Second offline 
channel or leave
Major problem
Minor problem
Second offline 
channel or leave
Solved the problems
Solved the problems
 −  
 
First options
 
 −  
Notation Definition 
V The base valuation 
𝑝𝑓 Service price of offline channel 
𝑝𝑜 Service price of online channel 
𝑐 
The marginal cost of serving a 
consumer in offline channel 
𝜀 Distance cost of getting offline service 
K Utility loss after misdiagnosis 
ℎ 
Effective diagnosis rate in online 
channel 
α 
Minor problem inspection rate in online 
diagnosis 
𝑈𝑓 The utility of consumers offline 
𝑈o The utility of consumers online 
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 𝑝𝑜
∗ =
ℎ𝛼𝑉−(1−ℎ)𝐾 
2
+
ℎ𝛼 
2(1−ℎ𝛼)
.                              (3.8) 
       𝑝𝑓
∗ =
𝑉+𝑐 
2
+
ℎ𝛼 
2(1−ℎ𝛼)
.                                          (3.9) 
Proposition 1. 𝑝𝑜
∗ and 𝑝𝑓
∗  increase with the increase in 
α and ℎ, respectively. 
When α or ℎ are higher, both the online and offline 
prices are higher. When some minor problems become 
prevalent, more consumers can obtain a solution online; 
then, the online channel will gain additional trust from 
consumers. Therefore, service providers can raise the 
price of the online channel to make extra money. When 
physicians attain an accurate diagnosis, customers will 
trust the online channel and purchase healthcare service 
more from online; thus, the price of the online channel 
increases. 
By substituting 𝑝𝑜
∗  and 𝑝𝑓
∗ for Equations (3.4) and 
(3.5), we can obtain 𝜀0 and 𝜀1 . Furthermore, we will 
obtain the demand of offline market and online market 
and ultimately the unresolved demand. 
Online demand: 
ℎ𝛼(1 − 𝜀0) =
ℎ𝛼(1+𝑐)−(1−ℎ)𝐾
2
.                           (3.10) 
Totally offline demand: 
𝜀1 − ℎ𝛼(𝜀1 − 𝜀0) =
(1−ℎ𝛼)𝑉+(1−ℎ)𝐾−𝑐
2
.             (3.11) 
Unsolved demand: 
(1 − ℎ𝛼)(1 − 𝜀0) = 1 −
ℎ𝛼+(1−ℎ𝛼)(𝑣−𝑐)
2
.          (3.12) 
Proposition 2. When  
K
K+α(1+c)
< h < 1  , consumers 
will choose the online channel.  
In this case, service providers should raise the offline 
price to obtain sufficient profit. Thus, misdiagnosis 
should not be too high, otherwise, consumers will not 
choose an online channel.  
According to the optimal pricing, we can also have 
the profit via online and offline channels.  
Overall profit: 
Π∗ =
1
4
[(𝑣 − 𝑐)2(ℎ𝛼𝑉 − 𝐾 + ℎ𝐾)(2 − 𝑉 + 2𝑐) −  
(𝑣 − 𝑐)2(ℎ𝛼𝑉 − 𝐾 + ℎ𝐾)
𝐾−ℎ𝐾
ℎ𝛼
+
ℎ𝛼
1−ℎ𝛼
].  (3.13) 
Online profit: 
Π𝑜
∗ = (1 − 𝜀0)𝑝0  
= (
1+𝑐
2
−
(1−ℎ)𝐾
ℎ𝛼
) [
ℎ𝛼𝑉−(1−ℎ)𝐾 
2
+
ℎ𝛼 
2(1−ℎ𝛼)
].  (3.14) 
Offline profit: 
Π𝑓
∗ = 𝜀0(𝑝𝑓 − 𝑐) + (1 − ℎα)(𝜀1 − 𝜀0)(𝑝𝑓 − 𝑐)  
= (
1−𝑐
2
+
(1−ℎ)𝐾
ℎ𝛼
) [
𝑉−𝑐 
2
+
ℎ𝛼 
2(1−ℎ𝛼)
] + 
(𝑉−𝑐)(1−ℎ𝛼)
2
[
𝑉−1
2
−
ℎ𝛼 
2(1−ℎ𝛼)
−
(1−ℎ)𝐾
ℎ𝛼
] + 
ℎ𝛼 
2
[
𝑉−1
2
−
ℎ𝛼 
2(1−ℎ𝛼)
−
(1−ℎ)𝐾
ℎ𝛼
].                          (3.15) 
Proposition 3. As ℎ increases, online profits increase, 
offline profits decrease, and overall profits increase. 
As the accuracy of the diagnosis increases, the 
online channel gains additional customers, and fewer 
customers will choose the offline channel. Therefore, 
the profit of the online channel will rise, and the profit 
of the offline channel will decrease. For the entire 
market, because the allocation of resources is effective, 
the profits of the entire market will increase, thereby 
improving social welfare. 
 
5. Discussion  
 
5.1 Interpretation of findings 
 
In this study, we investigate the impact of 
misdiagnosis rate and the severity of the health 
problems on the multichannel healthcare service market. 
Then we obtain the following conclusions.  
First, service providers must raise their price in online 
and offline channels according to effective diagnosis 
rate and the probability of minor problems. The 
effective diagnosis rate and the probability of minor 
problems also positively affect the optimal pricing of 
both online and offline channels. Second, when the rate 
of online misdiagnosis under a certain degree, 
consumers will prefer the online channel. Third, when 
the misdiagnosis rate is low, the online channel will 
attract other consumers, which results in the high profit 
of online channel and low profit of the online channel. 
However, under this circumstance, the entire 
multichannel profit increases. Thus, providing online 
channel service and alleviating offline treatment 
pressure are beneficial for multichannel service 
providers. 
 
5.2 Implications for research 
 
The results of this study have the potential to make 
several contributions to research. First, we think that this 
study covers the shortage of multichannel service in the 
healthcare industry. Although literature exists about 
multichannel services in retail industry [5], service 
industry, such as multichannel healthcare services, 
remains lacking. 
Second, the study of the misdiagnosis rate of the 
online channel is relatively new to supply chain research. 
Despite some studies on the relationship between 
misdiagnosis and customer satisfaction [36], only a few 
studies have considered the impact of misdiagnosis on 
pricing strategy in the multichannel market. 
Third, this study provides insights into the effect of 
different kinds of situations on users’ channel 
preferences. We find that minor problem inspection rate 
has a significant positive effect on customers’ choice of 
the online channel.  
 
5.3 Implications for practice 
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In practice, we put forward some management 
suggestions from three aspects. First, for the 
government, we propose that the government should 
strengthen the control of healthcare industry and pay 
attention to the quality of online healthcare service to 
reduce the probability of misdiagnosis so that other 
customers’ problems can find effective solutions 
through online and offline channels. Second, for the 
healthcare industry, we suggest that service providers 
can increase the investment to develop information 
technology, which can improve the quality of online 
healthcare service and reduce the pressure of excessive 
demand for offline healthcare service. Through the 
effective and rational allocation of resources, additional 
profits can be obtained. Third, for consumers, when the 
minor problems are prevalent, online service can help 
cut down on expenditure, save time, and improve 
service efficiency. We suggest that consumers who can 
solve minor problems at a lower cost should access the 
online channel instead of the offline channel, whereas 
consumers who must solve major problems at a higher 
cost can directly access the offline channel.   
 
5.4 Limitations and future research 
 
Overall, this study settles the question of how to 
manage multi-channel to allocate healthcare service 
resources rationally, which is conducive to multichannel 
operation and sustainable development of resources. 
However, some limitations are identified in in our study. 
First, we only consider dividing the disease into size 
problems and less on detailed problems. Different types 
of problems have different treatment methods. For 
example, chronic disease may require repeatedly online 
inquiries and long-term inspection, which will be a 
process of multiple decision making. Second, we did not 
consider the impact of healthcare conditions in different 
regions on the quality of service. For example, in 
relatively poor areas, the offline channel may not solve 
the problem, but online channel may have higher service. 
Third, we only consider the general situation without 
differentiating the effect of various cultures. Future 
research can consider cultural factors. 
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